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Abstract—Since their introduction over two decades ago,
physical side-channel attacks have presented a serious security
threat. While many ciphers’ implementations employ masking
techniques to protect against such attacks, they often leak secret
information due to unintended interactions in the hardware.
We present ROSITA, a code rewrite engine that uses a leakage
emulator which we amended to correctly emulate the micro-
architecture of a target system. We use ROSITA to automatically
protect masked implementations of AES and Xoodoo and show
the absence of observable leakage at only a 25% penalty to the
performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
The seminal work of Kocher [44] demonstrated that in-
teractions of cryptographic implementations with their envi-
ronment can result in side channels, which leak information
on the internal state of ciphers. Since then multiple side
channels have been demonstrated, exploiting various effects,
such as timing [1, 11, 18, 19], power consumption [45],
electromagnetic (EM) emanations [20, 35, 59], shared micro-
architectural components [37, 66], and even acoustic and
photonic emanations [4, 38, 46, 62]. These side channels pose
a severe risk to the security of systems, and in particular
to cryptographic implementations, and effective side-channel
attacks have been demonstrated against block and stream
ciphers [40, 60], public-key systems, both traditional [27, 55]
and post quantum [58], cryptographic primitives implemented
in real-world devices [5, 31], and even non-cryptographic
algorithms [8].
Many approaches to protect devices have been suggested,
in particular against power and EM attacks. These range from
special logic styles that are designed to make leakage data-
independent [22, 33, 65], through noise generation to hide the
signal [52], to algorithmic changes designed to prevent certain
leakage [51]. In particular, masking is a common algorithmic
countermeasure in which all intermediate (secret-dependent)
values in the ciphers are combined with random masks, so
that the leakage of one or even a few values does not provide
the attacker with enough information to recover the secrets.
The protection afforded by masking is, however, only the-
oretical. In practice, masked implementations often fail to
Table I: Results of running ROSITA to automatically fix
masked implementations of AES and Xoodoo.
Cycles Leakage Points
Function Original Fixed Original Fixed
AES 1285 1526 25 0
Xoodoo 637 794 38 0
achieve the promised level of security. One of the most com-
mon reasons for leakage from masked implementations is un-
intended interactions between values in the micro-architecture.
For example, the power consumption of updating the contents
of a register may depend on a relationship between the values
prior to and after the update.
To achieve secure cryptography in the presence of side-
channel attacks, cryptographic implementations often go
through multiple cycles of leakage evaluation, e.g. as specified
in International Standard ISO/IEC 17825:2016(E) [41]. Such
a process is costly because it requires a high level of expertise
and significant manual labor, especially taking into account
state-of-the-art side-channel adversaries.
Recently, several works have experimented with tools that
provide a high resolution emulation of the power consump-
tion [70]. The results of such emulations are combined with
standard statistical tests [10] to perform leakage assessment
of software without executing it on the actual hardware [57].
Observing that these tools eliminate the hardware from the
leakage evaluation process, we ask the following question:
Can leakage emulators be used for automatic mitigation of
side channel leakage from software implementations?
In this work, we answer this question in the affirmative (see
Table I for results), albeit with some caveats. Specifically, we
develop an automatic tool, ROSITA1, that uses an emulator
1We plan to open-source ROSITA so that others can utilize it and expand
on it.
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to detect leakage due to unintended interactions between
values and then rewrites the code to eliminate the leakage.
Automating leakage elimination reduces the amount of work
required to ensure adherence with the ISO 17825 standard,
and to develop secure cryptographic implementations.
          Simulation-based        
          leakage analysis 
ELMO* 
Rule-based code 
rewrite 
Original cipher 
Reduced-leakage 
cipher 
ROSITA 
Assess any 
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on real hardware 
Figure 1: Leakage elimination workflow with extended ELMO
(ELMO*) and ROSITA.
To emulate leakage, we develop ELMO*, an extended
version of the ELMO leakage emulator [50]. We find that,
while ELMO correctly emulates leakage between consecutive
instructions, it fails to emulate leakage caused by sharing
micro-architectural storage elements by instructions further
apart. We augment the ELMO model to account for storage
elements and develop a procedure to detect architecturally-
hidden elements. We identify several hidden elements in the
ARM Cortex-M0 we experiment with. We further modify
ELMO to not only output the instruction that causes the
leakage, but also to identify the cause of the leakage.
In its core, ROSITA is a rule-driven code rewrite engine.
It uses the output from ELMO* to select rewrite rules and
apply them at leaky points. To eliminate leakage, we follow
the workflow in Figure 1. We repeatedly execute ELMO* to
identify code locations that leak and then invoke ROSITA to
rewrite the code. Finally, we test the code produced by ROSITA
on the physical device to assess the level of remaining leakage.
We experiment with masked implementations of two ciphers
with very different round functions: the AES block cipher [24]
and the Xoodoo permutation [25], running up to 200 000 traces
on each. For AES we use the table-lookup based masked
implementation by Yao et al. [76]2. AES implemented with
2From https://github.com/Secure-Embedded-Systems/Masked-AES-
Implementation/blob/master/Byte-Masked-AES/byte mask aes.c
table lookups tends to be vulnerable to cache-based timing
attacks. Recent ciphers however, mostly permutations, can be
implemented efficiently with only bitwise Boolean instructions
and (cyclic) shifts, e.g., Keccak-p, the permutation underlying
SHA-3, [16, 30], Ascon [29], Gimli [13] and Xoodoo [26].
They all have a nonlinear layer of algebraic degree 2 and
hence allow very efficient masking. Among those, we chose
Xoodoo because it is the simplest of all and it lends itself to
efficient implementations for 32-bit architectures. Basically,
the two ciphers used are very different and together make our
analysis more comprehensive.
As Table I shows, ROSITA successfully eliminates leakage
from both AES and Xoodoo. The performance impact of
ROSITA is moderate 25%.
To sum up, the contributions of this work are:● We propose a framework for generating leakage-resilient
implementations of masked ciphers by iteratively rewriting
the code at leakage points. (Section III)● We develop techniques to identify multiple sources of
leakage that the ELMO leakage model fails to detect. We
extend ELMO and augment it to identify these sources of
leakage. We further augment ELMO to report instructions
that leak secret information and the specific cause of leakage
for each. (Section IV)● We develop ROSITA, a code rewrite engine that uses the
output of ELMO*, our augmented ELMO, to rewrite leaking
instructions and eliminate leakage. (Section V)● We use ROSITA to rewrite masked implementations of AES
and Xoodoo. We test the code ROSITA produces and show
the absence of observable leakage in up to 200 000 traces
for each cipher. (Section VI)
II. BACKGROUND
A. Side-Channel Attacks
When software runs on some hardware, it affects the en-
vironment it executes in. This effect can be manifested as
variations in power consumption, electromagnetic emanations,
temperature, and state of various CPU components. As these
variations correlate with the operation of the algorithm, moni-
toring these variations disclose information about the internal
state, and as such provides a ‘communication’ channel that
transfers information from the software being observed to the
observer. These unintended communication channels are often
known as side channels.
In 1996, Kocher [44] noted that the information acquired
through a timing side channel may reveal secret information
processed by a cryptographic algorithms. Since then a signifi-
cant effort has been dedicated to analyzing and eliminating
side-channel leakage, particularly in the context of crypto-
graphic implementations [9, 35, 45, 49, 59].
Protection against side-channel attacks depends on both
the channel and the attacker capabilities. The constant-time
programming style [12, 42], which avoids secret-dependent
branches and table lookups, has proven effective against at-
tacks that depend on the cryptographic operation timing or
on its effect on micro-architectural components [11, 18, 37].
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However, when the leakage correlates with the data values
being processed, constant-time programming is not sufficient
to protect the implementation.
One of the main approaches to protect cryptographic imple-
mentations against side channels that leak information on data
values is masking [21, 54]. In a nutshell, masking combines
internal values processed by the cryptographic algorithm with
random masks, typically by xoring a mask and the internal
value. The masked internal values are uniformly distributed,
thus the leakage of a masked value does not reveal any
information to the attacker.
Although theoretically secure, naive masking often fails
to provide the required protection. The main cause is that
side-channel leakage often correlates not only with the value
being processed, but also with interactions with other values
stored within the processor. Transitional effects are caused by
the differing power requirements between changing the value
of a stored bit and keeping its value unchanged. Thus, the
power required for changing the contents of a storage element
correlates not only with the new value stored in the element,
but also with the difference between the old and the new
values. Similarly, when multiple signals arrive at the input
of an electronic gate with different timing, a glitch may occur,
resulting in power consumption that correlates with the change
of the output signal [48].
For masked implementations, unintended interactions, such
as transitional effects and glitches can be disastrous. For
example, let us assume that the software processes two values,
v1 ⊕ m and v2 ⊕ m, where v1 and v2 are two internal
values that need to be kept secret, and m is a random mask.
Leaking either v1⊕m or v2⊕m provides the attacker with no
information, because these values are uniformly distributed.
However, if the software writes v1 ⊕ m to a register that
contains v2 ⊕m, the power consumption will correlate with(v1 ⊕m) ⊕ (v2 ⊕m) = v1 ⊕ v2, leaking information on the
relationship between the two unmasked values.
One approach for fixing this issue is to go to higher
order masking [53], where multiple masks are applied such
that secret values cannot be reconstructed with less than
n > 1 intermediate values. Specifically, Balasch et al. [6]
demonstrate that unintended interactions due to transitions
half the number of intermediate values the adversary needs to
acquire. However, algorithms that use high-order masking are
significantly more complex than simple first-order masking,
and require much more resources and randomness.
Thus, the common practice, from the practitioners’ point of
view, is to use first-order masking, and to combine it with
ad-hoc countermeasures for unintended interactions. Then,
the implementers of the cryptographic software typically un-
dergoes leakage assessment to find code locations that leak
information. If leakage is detected, the operator applies manual
modifications to the code to eliminate the leakage, this process
repeats until no further leakage is evident.
We now turn our attention to assessing leakage in crypto-
graphic implementations.
B. Side Channel Leakage Assessment
Leakage assessment of a device is very important for both
the semiconductor and the security evaluation industries, and
has accordingly received a lot of attention in past years.
Depending on the attacker model, many attack vectors are pos-
sible and exhaustive evaluation (by trying all possible attacks)
is simply not feasible. As an alternative, a leakage evaluation
methodology called Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA)
was proposed [23, 67]. The question that it answers relates
to the presence of any sort of leakage (from side channel
measurements) of the targeted implementation running on
the device of interest. TVLA does have some limitations.
Specifically, a negative answer does not mean that the device
is secure. However, the confidence level can be increased
by testing multiple times with different inputs. Similarly, a
positive result, indication leakage, does not tell much on the
exploitability of the leakage [63]. Nevertheless, due to its
simplicity and efficacy, the TVLA method is considered useful
first diagnostics tool for side-channel leakage assessment, and
it has become the popular tool for security analysts. The core
idea of TVLA is to use Welch’s t-test [73] to differentiate
between two sets of measurements, one with fixed inputs and
the other with random inputs. If the test finds a sufficiently
strong evidence that the measurements this implies that the
device leaks some data-dependent information through a side
channel. The main limitation is in evaluating each point in
time independently, so the leakage from combining multiple
points is not detected. To overcome this limitation, Schneider
and Moradi [63] extend the t-test to handle multiple points. In
addition, to address leakages distributed over multiple orders
they propose the use of the χ2-test as a natural complement
to the Welch’s t-test.
As a further guideline for analysts, the International Stan-
dard ISO/IEC 17825:2016(E) [41] suggests a specific proce-
dure for assessing the security of devices. Specifically, the
procedure requires selecting two fixed inputs and performing
TVLA measurements, comparing the traces with these fixed
inputs and those of random inputs. The number of traces in
each assessment depends on the desired security level and
ranges between 10 000 for level 3 and 100 000 for level 4.
C. Leakage Emulators
Because conducting real experiments for leakage detection
is costly, leakage emulation has been adapted as an alternative.
To the best of our knowledge, PINPAS [28], which detects
leakage in Java-based smart cards, is the first such emulator.
Since then, various other methods of emulating leakage have
been suggested. Among the most accurate use SPICE [56] to
simulate the internal circuits of a CPU down to a transistor
level Aigner et al. [3], Its drawback is that transistor-level
simulators tend to be very slow. Alternatively, researchers
have looked at emulating at the source code level [68] and
at machine instruction level [57, 69]. In source code level
emulation, the emulator does not have any information about
a specific CPU that will be used to run the compiled machine
code of a given source code. It emulates leakage having
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source code as its only input. In instruction level emulation,
the emulation is based on the machine code that will be
executed on a certain CPU or more generally a specific CPU
kind. Recently, advanced instruction level emulators have been
introduced that use power traces from real experiments to
make better estimates [50]. Similarly, advanced characteristics
of CPUs such as instruction pipelining have found their way
into recent leakage emulators [47].
D. Automatic Approaches to Handling Side-Channel Leakage
Due to the numerous problems and pitfalls with counter-
measures against side-channel attacks as previously discussed,
researchers developed several automated approaches for han-
dling side-channel leakage. The approaches can be grouped
into two categories, simulation-based and code analysis.
1) Simulation-based Approaches: Veshchikov [68] presents
the SILK simulator, which simulates a high level abstraction of
the source code of an algorithm that generates traces. Another
simulator, MAPS [47] targets the Cortex-M3 and bases its
leakage properties on the Hardware Description Language
(HDL) source code. The simulator mainly focuses on leakage
caused in the pipeline.
These two simulators only automate the generations of
traces. Hence, they are basically assisting the leakage eval-
uation process in terms of speeding it up.
2) Code Analysis: Barthe et al. [7] describe how to auto-
matically verify higher-order masking schemes and present a
new method based on program verification techniques. The
work of Wang and Schaumont [71] explains how formal
verification and program synthesis can be used to detect side-
channel leakage, prove the absence of such leakage and modify
software to prevent such leaks. However, both of these works
remain limited in the ways they model the hardware and actual
implementations.
Closer to ours are the works that, although sacrificing
generality, address the problem of “fixing” the leakage from
a specific device. Papagiannopoulos and Veshchikov [57]
performed an in-depth investigation of device specific effects
that violate the independent leakage assumption (ILA) [61].
They also provide an automated tool that can detect such
violations in AVR assembly code.
Another method to eliminate timing side channels in soft-
ware was proposed by Wu et al. [75]. Their method requires
a list with secret variables as input and produces code that
is functionally equivalent to the original code but without
timing side channels. In a recently published work Wang
et al. [72] describe a type-based method for detecting leaks in
source code. They implemented their mitigations in a compiler
and evaluated their method. Eldib and Wang [32] propose a
method to add countermeasures to source code that masks
all intermediate computation results such that all intermediate
results are statistically independent.
Agosta et al. [2] introduce a framework to automate the
application of countermeasures against Differential Power
Analysis (DPA). Their approach adds multiple versions of the
code preventing an attacker from recognizing the exact point
of leakage.
III. ROSITA OVERVIEW
ROSITA aims to automate the process of producing leakage-
resilient software. Specifically, we focus on reducing the
manual effort required for ensuring conformance with the
ISO 17825 standard. We assume that the underlying algorithm
employs a protection technique, such as masking. However,
unintended interactions between data introduced in the exe-
cution of the software, e.g. when overwriting one value with
another where both values are masked with the same mask,
can break the independent leakage assumption [61] and leak
secret information through a physical side channel, such as the
power channel. Thus, to fix such leaks, implementers typically
go through a manual, iterative process whereby the software
is installed on the target device, the leakage is measured, and
fixes are applied to the machine code, until the leakage is
reduced to an acceptable level for the target use case.
This process, naturally, requires a significant level of exper-
tise both in setting up and conducting the experiment to assess
the leakage and in fixing the software to reduce the leakage.
Moreover, because the assessment requires a large number of
encryption rounds on relatively low-performing devices, and a
number of repetitions in repairing the leakage and evaluating,
the process is time consuming.
ROSITA automates this process as shown in Figure 1. To
produce leakage-resilient cryptographic software, we start with
a (masked) implementation of the cryptographic primitive.
We use cross-compilation to produce both the assembly code
and the binary executable for the target device. The binary
executable is then passed to a leakage emulator, in our case
ELMO*, a modified version of ELMO [50], to perform leakage
assessment. This assessment identifies the leakage and the
machine instructions that cause it. ROSITA processes the
output of ELMO*, together with the assembly code. It applies
a set of rules that replace leaky assembly instructions with
functionally-equivalent sequences of instructions that do not
leak. Afterwards, the produced assembly program is assembled
and fed back to ELMO* and the process repeats until no further
fixes can be applied, at which time ROSITA produces a report
indicating the remaining leakage, if any.
Note that our approach makes use of a leakage emulator.
Prior static-analysis-based solutions, such as [47, 57, 68, 71,
75], rely on tags that identify the nature of values within
the program. For example, in ASCOLD [57] the programmer
needs to assign tags to values, e.g. identifying them as random
or masked. The main downside of the tagging approach is
that any mistake the programmer makes in tagging values can
be translated to missed leakage. In contrast, ROSITA applies
TVLA, using a procedure that extends ISO 17825, to the
emulated power trace. As such, ROSITA depends neither on
the programmer’s proficiency nor on specific properties of the
masking scheme to detect leakage. Subject to the accuracy of
the emulator and the strength of the statistical tools applied,
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ROSITA will detect leakage in the implementation (up to the
level which the masking scheme used is meant to protect).
IV. LEAKAGE EMULATION
Due to ROSITA’s reliance on a leakage emulator, care
should be taken when selecting one. For this work we se-
lect ELMO [50] as a basis because, unlike instruction-level
emulators, it is tailored to a specific processor model, while at
the same time it does not require detailed design information
to build its model. We now describe how ELMO models the
device it emulates and the leakage. We then identify limitations
for using ELMO with ROSITA and describe how we address
these and develop ELMO*.
A. The ELMO Leakage Model
Emulating the hardware at the transistor level would pro-
duce the most accurate leakage estimate. However, this is often
infeasible, both due to the complexity of such analysis and
because the hardware implementation details are not available
to the security evaluators and software developers.
Instead, leakage emulators use an abstract model of the
device and of its power consumption. The abstract model is
significantly simpler than emulating at the transistor level. At
the same time, using an abstract model reduces accuracy and
may result in missing some leakage. Thus, the leakage model
presents a trade-off between modeling cost and accuracy.
ELMO’s model of the hardware considers bit values and
changes in bit values over the Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU)
inputs and outputs and memory instructions. Specifically, each
operand is compared to the corresponding operand of the
preceding instruction. Power consumption is modeled as linear
combinations of bit values or bit changes.
ELMO models 21 instructions that its authors claim cover
typical use in cryptography. These 21 instructions are divided
into five groups, each modeled separately. To generate the
model, power traces are collected while the processor executes
sequences of three instructions. Each trace is processed to
select a point-of-interest to be used as a representative of the
trace. ELMO then performs a linear regression on the data
collected in the traces to find the coefficients for the model.
The model itself consists of 19 main components, each
modeling a specific part of the architecture. These cover:● A linear combination of the bit flips between each operand
of the current instruction and the corresponding operand of
the previous and the subsequent instructions.● A linear combination of the bit values of the operands of
the current instruction.● The instruction groups of the previous and subsequent
instructions.
ELMO provides a pre-computed model of the STM32F0303
evaluation board which features an ARM Cortex-M0 based
STM32F030R8T6 System-on-Chip (SoC).4
3https://www.st.com/en/evaluation-tools/32f0308discovery.html
4ELMO also provides a model for the Cortex-M4-based STM32F4 Discov-
ery board, which we do not use in this work.
B. Evaluation Setup
To evaluate ELMO, we compare its output with leakage
assessment of the code on the real hardware. Our evaluation
setup is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Evaluation Setup.
We evaluate ELMO with the same STM32F030 Discovery
evaluation board used in McCann et al. [50]. Following the
instructions of McCann et al., we disconnect one of the two
power inputs of the System on Chip (SoC) and attach a 330 Ω
shunt resistor to the second power input.
Oscilloscope
Shunt
Resistor
SoC
Control
PC
PiCi
Vcc
Figure 3: Evaluation Setup — Circuit Diagram
We use a PicoScope 6404D with a Pico Technology TA046
differential probe connected to the oscilloscope via a Langer
5
PA 303 preamplifier, to measure the voltage drop across the
shunt resistor as a proxy for the power consumption of the
SoC. See circuit diagram in Figure 3.
We sample every 12.8 ns, which, with a clock rate of 8 MHz,
is roughly 9.77 samples per clock cycle. The samples are 8-bit
wide and our PicoScope can store up to 2 giga samples before
running out of memory.
We use a control PC to orchestrate the experiments. The
PC controls the oscilloscope and the STM32F030 Discovery
evaluation board. It sends the software to be tested and the
data to be used to the evaluation board, and collects the trace
data from the oscilloscope.
Each experiment collects multiple power traces from run-
ning the software on the evaluation board. The execution of the
software alternates between the fixed and the random cases.
Thus, half of the collected traces are for the fixed case and
the other half is for the random tests. Fixed and random tests
are run randomly interleaved to make sure that the internal
state of the device is non-deterministic at the start of each
test [63]. To identify the start and end of the segment that we
monitor, we use the output pins of the device to trigger the
trace collection and to mark the end of the points of interest.
Later, we use these trigger points to filter out traces with clock
jitter. In order to align the traces, we use the eShard SCAred
library5.
To detect leakage, we employ non-specific TVLA. That is,
we check the distribution of the values at each trace point
(after alignment) and use the Welch t-test to check if the
samples in the fixed and in the random traces are drawn from
the same distribution. Following the common practice in the
domain, we use a t-test value above 4.5 or below −4.5 as an
indication of leakage. We validate the setup using the example
from McCann et al. [50], getting results similar to theirs. See
Appendix A.
C. Storage Elements and the ELMO Model
The ELMO model of the hardware only looks at interactions
between arguments and outputs of successive instructions.
However, it overlooks interactions that span multiple cycles.
These interactions happen between instruction arguments and
values that are stored in storage elements such as registers,
memory, or latches.
To evaluate interactions overlooked by ELMO, we design
a systematic battery of small sequences of code that aim at
highlighting interactions via storage elements between instruc-
tions. An example of such code is shown in Listing 1. The
code aims to check if there is an interaction between the value
stored in Line 1 and the value used as the second argument
of the eors instruction in Line 11. The purpose of the movs
instructions between the two tested instructions is to eliminate
leakage between pipeline stages. The sequence of five movs
instructions ensures that the str instruction is completed by
the time the eors instruction enters the pipeline.
5https://gitlab.com/eshard/scared
1 str r1, [r2]
2 movs r7, r7
3 movs r7, r7
4 movs r7, r7
5 movs r7, r7
6 movs r7, r7
7 movs r7, r7
8 movs r7, r7
9 movs r7, r7
10 movs r7, r7
11 eors r3, r4
Listing 1: Evaluating interactions between the str and
the eors instructions.
For the test, we collect 10 000 power traces of running
the code segment, each run using different random values
for the data the code processes. (For example, in Listing 1
we randomize r1, r3, r4, r7, and the contents of the
memory address pointed to by r2.) For each run we also
record the Hamming distance between the two values we
investigate. (In this example, the values of r1 and r4.) We
then calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient between the
Hamming distance and the values in each point of the trace.
A high correlation coefficient indicates that the Hamming
distance between the values leaks through the power trace,
implying that the first instruction keeps the value it processes
in some storage element that interacts with the data processed
by the last instruction.
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Figure 4: Pearson correlation coefficient of interference test.
Figure 4 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for two
code sequences. One from Listing 1, testing leakage from str
to eors, and the other testing leakage from ldr to eors.
As we can see, the code in Listing 1 show a pronounced
dip in the correlation coefficient around cycle 25, indicating
interaction between the values. Conversely, the correlation
coefficient when replacing the str with ldr remains close
to zero, indicating no leakage.
D. Dominating Instructions
The methodology we discuss in Section IV-C allows us to
find instruction pairs that interact via hidden storage within the
processor. However, each such instruction may affect multiple
6
storage elements. To correctly model leakage through these
elements, we need to know which instructions affect which
storage elements. Because design details of the processor are
not public, we cannot positively identify the storage elements
used by an instruction. Instead, we search for dominating
instructions in pairs, i.e. instructions that set more storage ele-
ments than others. For that, we use code sequences similar to
Listing 2, which checks if str dominates eors. Specifically,
we pick a pair of instructions with interacting storage. In the
test code we use two instances of the first (Lines 1 and 9), with
the second instruction separating these two instances (Line 5).
If the first instruction dominates the second, leakage will be
visible at the second instance of the first instruction (Line 9).
1 str r1, [r2]
2 movs r7, r7
3 movs r7, r7
4 movs r7, r7
5 eors r3, r7
6 movs r7, r7
7 movs r7, r7
8 movs r7, r7
9 str r4, [r5]
Listing 2: Checking for a dominating instruction
Theoretically, it is possible to have a pair of instructions that
each only affects part of the state set by the other. However,
we did not find any such pair.
E. Findings
We run a broad range of experiments, with (1) some
focusing on architecturally known storage elements, such as
registers and memory, and (2) others aiming to find micro-
architectural storage elements by testing interactions between
pairs of instructions. We find several sources of leakage that
ELMO does not identify. We note that Gao [36] also identifies
many of the issues we find; however, their identification was
driven by the iterative tweaking of a cipher, whereas our
systematic approach is cipher-agnostic.
1) Registers: We find that overwriting a register leaks the
(weighted) Hamming distance between the previous value
and the new value. This is a significant leakage source,
because reusing a register that contains a masked value for
another value with the same mask leaks secret information.
Unlike Papagiannopoulos and Veshchikov [57], we do not find
leakage across different registers.
2) Memory: Writing data to memory interacts with data
already stored in the same location. Hence, overwriting one
masked value with another may remove the mask, leaking the
values.
3) Instruction Pairs: We analyzed all pairs of instructions
for leakage from both arguments. The results for the second
argument are summarized in Table II. We see that all instruc-
tions set some state, and that most pairs do interact with this
state. We now discuss some of our observations about the
storage elements used.
Table II: State interactions between the second operands of
instruction pairs. Triangles point to the dominating instruction.
Circles indicate interactions on the same storage.
eo
rs
ad
ds
an
ds
bi
cs
cm
ps
m
ov
or
rs
su
bs
ls
ls
ro
rs
ls
rs
m
ul
s
st
r
st
rb
st
rh
ld
r
ld
rb
ld
rh
po
p
pu
sh
eors
adds
ands
bics
cmps
mov
orrs
subs
lsls
rors
lsrs
muls
str
strb
strh
ldr
ldrb
ldrh
pop
push
4) Memory Bus: The memory bus seems to have a storage
element that stores the most recent value stored to or loaded
from the memory. When loading from or storing to memory,
the value of the storage element is overwritten, leaking the
Hamming distance between the previous and the new value.
This leakage differs from the two described above, and hap-
pens irrespective of the registers and the memory addresses
used. Consequently, when writing to or reading from memory,
care should be taken to only access non-secret values or values
masked with different masks. We note that the storage element
could be the contents of the addressed memory itself, where
the power leakage correlates with changing the contnts of the
memory bus.
It is important to note that the storage element always
stores a 32-bit word. Thus, when loading or storing a byte,
the whole 4-byte aligned 32-bit word that contains the byte
is moved to the storage element. This may create memory
interaction between memory operations that seem completely
unrelated. For example, consider the code in Listing 3. In
this example we assume that memory locations 0x300 and
0x400 both contain one secret byte each, both masked with the
same mask. The code in this example performs two memory
operations, the first stores a byte into address 0x303 and the
second reads a byte from location 0x402. We note that none
of these locations contains secret data, and the data stored is
also not secret. However, the store operation loads the 32-bit
word in memory locations 0x300–0x303 into the memory bus,
and the following load operation replaces the contents with the
32-bit word in memory location 0x400–0x403. This causes an
interaction between the data in memory locations 0x300 and
0x400, leaking the Hamming distance between the data stored
in these locations.
1 movs r3, 0x303
2 movs r4, 0x402
3 movs r7, r7
4 movs r7, r7
7
5 movs r7, r7
6 strb r5, [r3]
7 movs r7, r7
8 movs r7, r7
9 movs r7, r7
10 ldrb r6, [r4]
11 movs r7, r7
12 movs r7, r7
13 movs r7, r7
Listing 3: Example of word interaction
A further issue in the memory bus is an interaction be-
tween the bytes of words loaded from or stored to memory.
Specifically, our analysis shows that when memory data is
accessed, consecutive bytes in the word interact with each
other. Thus, if a word contains multiple bytes that are all
masked with the same mask, loading it from or storing it to
memory will leak the Hamming distance between consecutive
bytes. We note that due to the memory bus storage element
described above, the leakage occurs even if the memory access
operations access a single byte of a 32-bit word.
5) Store Latch: We find that storing a register to memory
results in potential interactions between the value of that
register and the second argument of subsequent ALU instruc-
tions, such as eors. However, if the contents of the register
changes between the str and the ALU instruction, the second
argument of the ALU instruction interacts with the updated
value of the register rather than with its original value.
1 str r5, [r3]
2 movs r7, r7
3 movs r7, r7
4 movs r7, r7
5 movs r5, r2
6 movs r7, r7
7 movs r7, r7
8 movs r7, r7
9 eors r1, r4
Listing 4: Store latch example.
For example, in the example in Listing 4, the code stores
the value of r5 to memory (Line 1). It then updates the
value of r5, moving the contents of r2 to it (Line 5).
Finally, it calculates the exclusive-or of r1 and r4. Our
experiments show leakage in Line 9, which correlates with
the Hamming distance between the original values of r2 and
r4. Interestingly, we note that the update of the interacting
register takes one cycle to become effective. That is, removing
Lines 6–8 in Listing 4 removes the interaction between the
original values of r2 and r4, but leaves an interaction between
the original values of r5 and r4.
We believe that the processor maintains a reference to
the most recently stored register. This reference is used as
an input to a multiplexor that selects the contents of the
referenced register. Implementing the str instruction requires
two cycles [34, Figure 4.6]. In the first, the processor calculates
the store address and in the second it performs the store.
We believe that, to avoid locking the register file, in the first
cycle the processor copies the contents of the register to an
intermediate latch, from which it is retrieved in the second
cycle. We believe that a glitch on the bus causes interference
between the contents of the latch and the second argument of
subsequent instructions, explaining the leakage we observe.
F. Extending the ELMO Model
Recall (Section IV-A) that ELMO builds its model using a
linear regression from traces collected from sequences of three
instructions. To account for the effects of storage elements
we identified, we update the model to include a few more
components. We call out extension ELMO*.
Whereas the ELMO model treats each operand separately,
we also look at combinations of bits across the two operands
of the instruction. Because the first operand is typically the
destination register, correlating the two operands captures the
effect of calculating the result of the operation and overwriting
the destination register.
To capture interactions via memory and internal storage
elements, we track the contents of these elements, and add
model components that correlate with them.
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Figure 5: Leakage from str to eors.
In total, our model consists of 25 components. We validate
our model by repeating the test cases used for identifying the
storage elements. For example, Figure 5 shows the real and the
emulated leakage from running the code in Listing 1 on the
real hardware, ELMO, and in ELMO*. We see that our model
identifies the leakage that the original ELMO model misses.
V. CODE REWRITE IN ROSITA
As Section III describes, the core of ROSITA is a rewrite
engine that uses the output of the ELMO* emulator to drive
code fixes for leakage. We assume that the original code is
masked, i.e. it does not leak at the algorithm level. However,
the translation of the algorithm into machine code and the
execution of this machine code can result in unintended and
unexpected leakage. In this section, we review the causes of
leakage we identify, and describe the fixes the ROSITA applies
for each. We begin with a high-level description of ROSITA
and proceed with the details of the rewrite rules it applies.
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A. ROSITA Design
ROSITA is a rewrite engine that takes the code and the output
of ELMO*, and rewrites the code to avoid leakage. To decide
which rewrite rule to apply, ROSITA needs more information
than the original ELMO provides. Specifically, when leakage
is identified, ROSITA needs to know the cause of the leakage.
To find the cause of the leakage, ELMO* not only emulates
the leaked signal, but also finds which of the components
of the model is causing the leak. We, therefore calculate
the t-test value not only for the combined emulated signal,
but also to separate components of the signal.6 Thus, for
example, we keep track of the t-test value of the part of
the signal contributed by each of the instruction operands, by
interactions between the instruction result and its operands,
and by interactions between the instruction results or operands
with values previously stored to or loaded from memory. Using
this information, when ELMO* reports that an instruction
leaks, we can inspect the components and identify the leakage
cause.
The main strategy ROSITA uses to fix the leakage is to wipe
stored state with a random mask. For that, ROSITA dedicates a
mask register (ROSITA uses register r7), which is initialized
with a random 32-bit mask. When compiling the software, we
use the flag -ffixed-r7 to direct the compiler not to use
the mask register, ensuring that its contents are not modified
except by ROSITA.
B. Operand Interaction
One of the common forms of unintended interaction is
between the operands of successive instructions. Technically,
as McCann et al. [50] note, loading an operand to the bus leaks
the Hamming distance between the value previously held in
the bus and the new value. If both values use the same mask,
the Hamming distance between the masked values is the same
as that between the original values.
ROSITA identifies such leakage by checking the various t-
test values calculated for the operands and their relationship
with those of prior instructions. In the case that the leakage
is caused by such interaction, ROSITA inserts an access to the
mask register, using movs r7, r7 The instruction moves
the contents of the mask register into the mask register, and is
therefore functionally a no-op. However, because the value of
the mask register goes through the bus, the previous contents
of the bus is wiped, removing the interaction between the two
masked values.
C. Register Reuse
Due to the limited number of registers, compilers and
programmers often reuse those, e.g. when the old contents are
either consumed or stored in memory. Reusing a register rarely
removes the old contents from it. Consequently, when new
data is loaded into a register, it interacts with algorithmically
unrelated data that remains from prior uses of the register.
6Implementation note: to reduce memory usage, we calculate the t-test
values incrementally, using Welford’s algorithm [74].
Papagiannopoulos and Veshchikov [57] note that if the old
contents and the new contents are both masked using the
same mask value, the difference between the masked contents,
i.e. their exclusive or, is the same as the difference between
the unmasked contents. Consequently, when a register is used
consecutively for two values with the same mask, it leaks the
difference between the values.
To identify this form of leakage, ROSITA checks the t-test
value of overwriting register value. Once identified, ROSITA
wipes the old contents of the register by copying the contents
of the mask register to the destination register of the leaking
instruction, as Papagiannopoulos and Veshchikov [57] suggest.
For example, suppose that the instruction movs r3, r4
leaks because both r3 and r4 contain values masked with
the same mask. To eliminate the leak, ROSITA inserts movs
r3, r7 before the leaking instruction.
D. Rotation Operations
Rotation operations show interaction between the value pre
and post rotation. When a single masked value is rotated, this
interaction is unlikely to leak secret data because the mask
hides the contents. However, when rotating a word comprised
of multiple masked values that all use the same mask, the
result of the rotation may align the masked values, effectively
nullifying the mask, leaking the difference of the unmasked
values.
We propose two approaches to remove this leakage. As an
example, suppose that we would like to rotate the register
r2, whose value is a concatenation of four masked bytes:(b1 ⊕m)∣∣(b2 ⊕m)∣∣(b3 ⊕m)∣∣(b4 ⊕m). Rotation of r2 by a
multiple of 8 bits would result in leakage of information on the
value of the bi’s. For example, assuming r3 contains the value
8, the instruction ror r2, r3 would set the value of r2 to(b2 ⊕m)∣∣(b3 ⊕m)∣∣(b4 ⊕m)∣∣(b1 ⊕m), and the interaction
between the original and the rotated values of r2 would leak
the Hamming weight of (b1⊕b2)∣∣(b2⊕b3)∣∣(b3⊕b4)∣∣(b4⊕b1).
Word Mask. A straightforward approach for preventing such
leakage is to mask the word with our mask register (r7), rotate
both the word and the mask register and then use the rotated
mask to unmask the word. Thus, instead of rotating r2, we
rotate r2⊕r7. As an example, Figure 6 shows how ROSITA
fixes a rors r2, r3 instruction that ELMO* indicates is
leaking.
rors r2, r3 eors r2, r7
rors r2, r3
rors r7, r3
eors r2, r7
Figure 6: Masking rotation operations. The leaking ror
operation on the left is replaced with a masking sequence on
the right.
We note that this sequence modifies the contents of our
mask register. However, this has no effect on the functionality
because the mask register is assumed to be random and there
is no long-term dependency on its exact contents.
9
Partial Rotations. An alternative approach is to combine
multiple shifts to avoid rotations of multiples of the data size.
For example, a rotation by 8 bits can be replaced with a
rotation by 3 bits followed by a rotation by 5 bits.
ROSITA employs the word mask approach both because it is
more general, i.e. does not depend on the size of the rotation,
and because it already has the mask register, which it uses for
the other fixes.
E. Memory Operations
As discussed in Section IV-E, there are several effects that
can cause interactions between values used in memory opera-
tions. These include a storage element in the memory bus that
remembers recently accessed memory value and consequently
leaks the Hamming distance between the remembered value
and the current one on memory access operations, interaction
between loaded and stored values and the previous contents
they overwrite, and an interaction between bytes in stored
words.
When ELMO* indicates that a load instruction leaks due
to interaction with the memory bus storage element, ROSITA
wipes the contents of the bus by pushing the mask register
to the stack and popping from the stack to the destination
register of the load instruction. Figure 7 shows an example
of an ldr instruction (left) that leaks through interaction of
the loaded value with a previously loaded value. To fix this,
ROSITA inserts a push and a pop instructions before the
load, yielding the code fragment in the right. Popping the
mask to the destination of the load instruction also protects
against leakage through interaction with the previous value of
the destination register.
ldr r2, [r3] push r7
pop r2
ldr r2, [r3]
Figure 7: A leaking load instruction (left) and the fixed
sequence (right).
Due to the more intricate potential interactions, the picture
with store instructions is a bit more complex. To overcome
interactions with the previous value used on the memory bus
and to address possible interactions with the previous contents
of memory, ROSITA first stores the mask register into the
destination location and then performs the required store (See
Figure 8).
str r2, [r3] str r7, [r3]
str r2, [r3]
Figure 8: A leaking store instruction (left) and the fixed
sequence (right).
When byte interaction within the stored data leaks, ROSITA
stores one byte at a time. In such a case, care should be
taken to ensure that these bytes and the operations required for
their storage do not create unintended interactions, leading to
a relatively long code segment in Figure 9. The code uses two
registers chosen to not conflict with the store, r0 and r6 in
the example in Figure 9. The first is used for selecting the byte
to store, while the second is used for the byte. ROSITA uses
two stores for each byte to avoid interactions on the memory
bus or in the DRAM. While this rewrite rule eliminates the
leakage, the performance cost of using it is significant. As
such, it may be better to avoid stores of words that contain
multiple values masked with the same mask. Changing the
logic of the cipher is outside the scope of ROSITA.
str r2, [r3] push {r6}
push {r0}
movs r0, #0xff
movs r6, r2
ands r7, r7
ands r6, r0
lsls r0, #0
strb r0, [r3, #0]
strb r6, [r3, #0]
movs r6, r7
movs r6, r2
movs r0, #0xff
lsls r0, #8
ands r7, r7
ands r6, r0
lsrs r0, #8
lsrs r6, #8
strb r0, [r3, #1]
strb r6, [r3, #1]
.
.
.
pop {r0}
pop {r6}
Figure 9: Addressing byte interaction in stores. A leaking store
instruction (left) and part of the fixed sequence (right).
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate ROSITA with masked implementations of two
cryptographic primitives. AES [24] is one of the most com-
monly used ciphers, having been an international standard
since 2001. We use the byte-masked implementation by Yao et
al. [76]7. To perform the SHIFTROWS operation of AES, which
permutes bytes in the data being encrypted, the implementation
uses byte loads and stores. Following the suggestion of Gao
[36], we use different masks for each row to avoid leakage
through interactions between bytes in memory words.
Efficient software AES implementations on CPUs (without
dedicated AES instruction) use table lookups, which makes
them vulnerable to cache-based attacks. As an example of a
7https://github.com/Secure-Embedded-Systems/Masked-AES-
Implementation/tree/master/Byte-Masked-AES
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modern primitive, the second cipher we use is the crypto-
graphic permutation Xoodoo. Xoodoo was proposed recently
by Daemen et al. in [25] for use in authenticated encryption
modes [26]. The optimized and non-masked implementation
of Xoodoo we took from [15] and we implemented 2-share
boolean masking scheme of Bertoni et al. [14] ourselves.
A. Fixing Leakage
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Figure 10: Fixed vs. random test for AES (200K traces).
We first show ROSITA’s success in fixing the leakage it
detects. Figure 10a shows the results of a non-specific fixed vs.
random experiments with 200 000 traces of executing the first
round of the AES implementation. The figure shows leakage
(t-value above the threshold of 4.5) around cycles 500–550,
which correspond to the AES SHIFTROWS operation. As
Figure 10b shows, ROSITA detects the leaks and fixes them.
This fix does not, however, come for free. The first round
now takes 1 520 cycles, compared with 1 285 for the original
implementation—a slowdown of 18%. Figures 11a and 11b
show similar results for Xoodoo, with a 25% slowdown (637
vs. 795 cycles).
To determine the trend of leakage, we perform the fixed
vs. random test on the hardware with a varying number of
traces. Figure 12 shows the results for both the original and the
fixed implementations. The horizontal axis shows the number
of traces used for the fixed vs. random test, and the vertical
is the maximum absolute value of the t-test for each of the
implementations. As we can see, the original implementations
show increasing leakage, significant leakage is visible even
with as little as 1 000 traces, and the confidence increases as
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Figure 11: Fixed vs. random test for Xoodoo (200K traces).
traces are added. In contrast to this, our fixed implementation
does not show any significant leakage at up to 200 000 traces.
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Figure 12: t-test value trend.
B. Multiple Fixed Inputs
One of the known limitations of TVLA is that it may miss
some leakage if used with only one input [64]. Thus, com-
mon operating procedures require running multiple fixed vs.
random tests, each with a different fixed input. For example,
the ISO 17825 standard requires two fixed inputs. To test the
impact of multiple fixed inputs, we perform multiple fixed
vs. random tests, each with a different randomly chosen fixed
input. To combine the results of multiple experiments, we
use the largest absolute t-value calculated for a sample point
as a representative for leakage at that point. Thus, if any of
the fixed vs. random tests indicates leakage at a point, the
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combined result will also indicate leakage there. The top row
of Figures 14 and 15 shows the combined results from 1, 5,
and 100 fixed inputs for AES and Xoodoo, respectively. As
we can observe, when we increase the number of fixed points,
the number of locations that show leakage increases.
Running ROSITA with these inputs allows us to fix all of
these leakages. Repeating the experiment with the the code
that ROSITA produces and the same fixed inputs we get the t-
test values in the bottom rows of these figures. We can observe
that ROSITA fixes the leakage, at a cost to the performance.
Table III compares the performance of the code before and
after running ROSITA, showing a maximum overhead of 25%.
Table III: Encryption length (cycles) after fixing with ROSITA
with varying number of fixed inputs.
cipher Original 1 Fixed 5 Fixed 100 Fixed
AES 1 285 1 519 1 520 1 526
Xoodoo 637 765 771 794
The number of leakage points identified depends on the
fixed inputs chosen for the fixed vs. random test. To better
understand the relationship, we want to find out how many
leakage points we expect to find for a given number of fixed vs.
random inputs. Figure 13 shows this for AES and Xoodoo. For
a given number of inputs, the plots display the average number
of leakage points that ELMO* discovers over 10 selections of
inputs. The figure also displays the 95% confidence interval.
We see that 10 fixed inputs are enough to find 93% of the
leakage points in AES and 98% in Xoodoo.
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Figure 13: Average number of leaks per fixed inputs.
When we compare the identified leakage points against the
ground truth, we find that many of the discovered leakage
points are false positives, explaining the discrepancy between
the figures and Table I. To verify that we discover all of the
real leakage points, we use ROSITA with 100 fixed inputs to
fix AES and Xoodoo. We then use the produced code on the
hardware with a new set of 100 fixed inputs. We found no
evidence for leakage with either AES or Xoodoo.
C. Performance
The performance bottleneck for ROSITA is running ELMO*
to generate the simulated traces. We can collect 10 000 traces
of AES in 26 seconds, and Xoodoo in 21. In comparison, the
code rewrite phase of ROSITA takes around 0.1 seconds.
Collecting the same amount of traces from the hardware
takes 117 seconds for AES, and 147 for Xoodoo. We note
that although Xoodoo is faster than AES, collection is slower,
because we need to provide the masked implementation of
Xoodoo much more randomness, and the communication
dominates the execution time. Thus, ELMO* is 4.5–7 times
faster than the real hardware.
We note that the task of collecting traces is ridiculously
parallelizable. Hence, on a typical desktop, we can collect
traces eight times faster, and with an investment of $1 000
we can double the rate again. In contrast, to prallelize trace
collection from the hardware, we would need to replicate the
setup, at a cost of over $10 000 per node. Thus, the effective
speed of ROSITA is about two order of magnitude faster than
the hardware.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Possibly the main limitation of ROSITA is that, while we
have found no evidence for leakage, there is no guarantee that
it fixes all leakage. There two main reasons for that:● Methodology: While popular and standardized, non-
specific fixed vs. random tests are not a panacea for leakage.
Leakage they detect is not necessarily exploitable and the
absence of detection does not necessarily mean that no
leakage exists. In particular, the method only detects first-
order leakage. We note, however that this does not detract
from ROSITA achieving its aim of assisting in assessing
compliance with the standard.● Model Limitations: ROSITA relies on ELMO* which is
only a model of the hardware. Gaps between the model and
the real hardware, both in terms of capturing the hardware
behavior and in terms of accuracy of the model can result
in missed leakage. For this reason we recommend that
operators do not rely solely on ROSITA. It can be used to
achieve a high degree of assurance, and is likely to automate
a significant part of the work required for compliance, but
testing with the real hardware is essential.
A further limitation of ROSITA, which, like others, stem
from the ELMO* model is its suitability for other processors.
ELMO* uses a very simple model of the processor. It is suitable
for small, in-order, cacheless microcontrollers, such as the
Cortex-M0, AVR processors such as the ATMEGA328p, or
12
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(a) One fixed input – before ROSITA.
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(b) Five fixed inputs – before ROSITA.
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(c) 100 fixed inputs – before ROSITA.
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(d) One fixed input – after ROSITA.
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(f) 100 fixed inputs – after ROSITA.
Figure 14: t-test of masked AES implementation before and after ROSITA, varying the number of fixed vs. random pairs.
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(f) 100 fixed inputs – after ROSITA.
Figure 15: t-test of masked Xoodoo implementation before and after ROSITA, varying the number of fixed vs. random pairs.
small RISC-V processors. However, the model is unlikely to
be suitable for more advanced processors. Nonetheless, we
believe that the ROSITA is important, because these microcon-
trollers it targets are extremely popular in embedded devices,
where they often implement cryptographic functionalities. At
the same time, there is very little control of the physical
environment of such devices, allowing the attacker unfettered
access and enabling the type of attacks we defend against. We
leave porting ELMO* and ROSITA to other microcontrollers to
future work.
Another direction to which ROSITA could be extended
is using other statistical tests. While the ISO 17825 does
not require them, tests such as mutual information [39] and
χ2 [43], have been proven useful as statistical distinguishers.
It may also be possible to extend ROSITA to use correlation
power analysis (CPA) [17]. This would, however, require the
operator to provide ROSITA with possible values to search for
correlation. It is not clear that this can be done in a generic
fashion.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Since their introduction over two decades ago, physical side-
channel attacks have presented a serious security threat, par-
ticularly to small computational devices that need to maintain
secrets under the physical control of the adversary. To protect
against such attacks, many ciphers’ implementations employ
masking techniques that combine intermediate values with
randomly selected masks. As a consequence, due to the mask
being uniformly distributed, leakage of a masked value does
not reveal information to the adversary. While proven secure
against certain attacks, in practice masked implementations
often leak secret information due to unintended interactions
between masked values involving hardware they are loaded
and stored to. To fix these leaks, the common practice is to
repeatedly “tweak the code until it stops leaking”.
In this work, we have set out to explore if leakage emulators
can be used for the automatic elimination of side channel leak-
age from software implementations. To achieve this, we have
created a code rewrite engine called ROSITA and combined it
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with the extended leakage emulator ELMO*:● ROSITA incorporates rules to mitigate leakage arising from
operand interactions, register reuse, rotation operations, and
memory operations.● ELMO has undergone a major upgrade to ELMO* for two
reasons: firstly, it had to be able to tell ROSITA the cause
of the leakage, and secondly, we have added support by
including the values that instructions store in various micro-
architectural storage elements, which hold state that can leak
information.
In our proof-of-concept, we used ROSITA with ELMO* to
automatically protect masked implementations of AES and
Xoodoo. Our experiments using the actual hardware show the
absence of exploitable leakage at only a 25% penalty to the
performance.
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APPENDIX A
VALIDATING THE SETUP
To validate our setup, we reproduce the results of McCann
et al. [50]. Specifically, we perform a fixed vs. random test
on the code in Listing 5, which contains an implementation
of one of the steps in the AES encryption known as the
SHIFTROWS operation. Specifically, register r1 points to the
16 bytes that represent the state of the AES encryption.
SHIFTROWS performs a fixed permutation of these bytes. The
implementation loads three four-byte words and uses the rors
instruction to rotate the bytes, before storing them back to the
state.
ldr r4, [ r1, #4 ]
rors r4, r5
str r4, [ r1, #4 ]
ldr r4, [ r1, #8 ]
rors r4, r6
str r4, [ r1, #8 ]
ldr r4, [ r1, #12 ]
rors r4, r3
str r4, [ r1, #12 ]
Listing 5: SHIFTROWS from McCann et al. [50]
For the fixed vs. random test we collect 2500 traces where
the state contains fixed data masked with the same mask value
and 2500 traces where the state consists of random values
masked with the same mask. A random value for the mask
is chosen for each trace. We compare the distribution of the
power reading in each sample point between the fixed and
the random traces, and calculate the Welch t-test to check
the likelihood that the two distributions are the same. As
mentioned before, following common practice in side-channel
analysis, we consider the distributions different enough to
indicate leakage if the absolute value of the t-test value is
above 4.5.
Figure 16a shows the result of the fixed vs. random test. The
horizontal axis shows the time and the vertical axis shows the
t-test value. We indicate instruction boundaries with vertical
bars, and the t-test threshold of ±4.5 with horizontal red lines.
Comparing the figure to the results of running ELMO on the
same code, shown in Figure 16b, we see that ELMO produces
a fairly accurate simulation of the leakage.
In particular, our figure resembles Figure 5 of McCann et al.
[50], with only minor differences that reflect the different test
environment.
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(a) Real traces in STM32F030.
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(b) Simulated traces from ELMO.
Figure 16: Fixed vs. random of the AES SHIFTROWS opera-
tion.
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